Part 2 Mnangagwas Failings

Further Analysis of Mnangagwa’s Policies:

This Article is a continuation of a Question of Talent within Zanu PF and their 'Administration (see previous Article CLICK HERE)

Analysing Emmerson Mnangagwa’s policies as president of Zimbabwe since November 2017 involves examining their intent, implementation, and outcomes across key areas: economic management, governance, infrastructure, agriculture, and foreign relations. The focus here is on their practical impact, drawing from observable results rather than stated goals alone, and situating them within Zimbabwe’s challenging context—marked by decades of decline under Robert Mugabe, international sanctions, and domestic political tensions.

Economic Management

Mnangagwa’s flagship economic policy, encapsulated in the “Zimbabwe is Open for Business” mantra, aimed to attract foreign investment and stabilize the economy post-Mugabe. Key initiatives include:

• Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP, 2018-2020): Led by Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube, this austerity-driven plan sought to cut public spending, remove subsidies, and introduce a new currency (the RTGS dollar, later replaced). It included a controversial 2% tax on electronic transactions to boost revenue. Implementation faltered due to public backlash—fuel price hikes in January 2019 sparked deadly protests—and persistent currency instability. Inflation soared to over 500% by 2020, eroding purchasing power.
• Currency Reforms: The reintroduction of the Zimbabwean dollar in 2019 (abandoning the multi-currency system) and the launch of the gold-backed Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) in April 2024 aimed to curb hyperinflation and black-market trading. While the ZiG has shown early signs of stabilizing exchange rates, public trust remains low due to past currency collapses, and parallel markets persist. Real GDP growth was 8.5% in 2021 (a post-COVID rebound), but it slowed to 3% by 2023, per World Bank estimates, far below the 10% annual target of Mnangagwa’s “Vision 2030” for upper-middle-income status.
• Outcome: Economic policies have failed to deliver sustainable growth or investor confidence. FDI inflows remain negligible (e.g., $340 million in 2022, per UNCTAD), dwarfed by regional peers like Zambia ($1.1 billion). Unemployment exceeds 80% informally, and poverty affects over 70% of the population, per ZimStat 2023 data. Talent in design exists—Ncube’s academic credentials suggest capability—but execution is undermined by corruption and lack of structural reform.

Governance and Political Administration

Mnangagwa promised a break from Mugabe’s authoritarianism, pledging democratic reforms and reconciliation:

• Elections: The 2018 and 2023 elections were meant to signal legitimacy. Both were disputed—2018 saw post-election violence killing six, while 2023 faced SADC and AU criticism for irregularities (e.g., delayed ballots in opposition areas). The opposition CCC, led by Nelson Chamisa, was systematically weakened through arrests and court rulings favoring ZANU-PF.
• Anti-Corruption Drive: The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) was empowered, but high-profile arrests (e.g., former Health Minister Obadiah Moyo in 2020 over a $60 million COVID-19 scandal) rarely led to convictions, suggesting selective enforcement. Corruption Perceptions Index scores stagnated (24/100 in 2023), reflecting entrenched patronage.
• Outcome: Governance policies prioritize regime survival over civic improvement. Repression—e.g., over 1,500 abductions reported by human rights groups since 2018—contradicts reform rhetoric. The World Bank’s government effectiveness score (8.2/100 in 2022) underscores administrative weakness, with no clear talent driving systemic change.

Infrastructure Development

Mnangagwa’s administration emphasized physical infrastructure to boost economic activity:

• Roads and Energy: Projects like the Harare-Beitbridge highway upgrade (begun in 2018, partially completed by 2023) and dam construction (e.g., Gwayi-Shangani) were prioritized. Power generation expansions at Hwange Thermal Station added capacity, but rolling blackouts persist—up to 18 hours daily in 2023—due to mismanagement and debt to Eskom (South Africa).
• Funding: Heavy reliance on Chinese loans (e.g., $1.2 billion for Hwange) and private partnerships reflects fiscal constraints, with public debt at 92% of GDP in 2023 (IMF data).
• Outcome: Progress is visible but patchy—rural areas lag, and maintenance is poor. Execution reflects intent but not sustained competence, as funding and planning gaps limit impact.

Agriculture and Land

Agriculture, Zimbabwe’s backbone, was targeted for revival post-land reform:

• Command Agriculture (2016, continued under Mnangagwa): A state-subsidized input scheme aimed to boost maize production. It achieved bumper harvests (e.g., 2.8 million tons in 2021), but inefficiencies—$3 billion in unpaid loans by 2022—and elite capture undermined scalability. Drought in 2023-2024 slashed output, exposing reliance on weather over policy resilience.
• Land Tenure: Promises to secure titles for resettled farmers stalled, deterring investment. Tobacco exports rose (208 million kg in 2022), but benefits skew toward large-scale farmers tied to ZANU-PF.
• Outcome: Policies show short-term gains but lack strategic depth. Food insecurity persists—5.5 million needed aid in 2024 (UN OCHA)—indicating no transformative administrative talent.

Foreign Relations

Mnangagwa sought to re-engage the West while deepening ties with China and Russia:

• Re-engagement: Efforts to clear $17 billion in external debt and join the Commonwealth floundered due to human rights concerns and unpaid arrears ($6.5 billion to World Bank/IMF by 2023). Sanctions from the US and EU remain, though selectively eased in 2024.
• Eastern Pivot: China’s $3 billion in investments since 2018 (mining, infrastructure) and Russian military ties bolster the regime but tie Zimbabwe to extractive deals with limited local benefit.
• Outcome: Diplomatic survival is achieved, but economic isolation persists. Policy reflects pragmatism, not visionary leadership.

Assessment

• Mnangagwa’s policies reveal a mix of ambition and inertia. Economic measures aim for stabilization but falter on execution, crippled by corruption and mistrust.
• Governance prioritizes control over reform, while infrastructure and agriculture show incremental gains without addressing root causes—debt, mismanagement, and patronage.
• Foreign policy secures allies but not broad-based recovery.
• Talent, if present (e.g., technocrats like Ncube), is stifled by a system favouring loyalty over competence.
• No policy has demonstrably shifted Zimbabwe toward success on global metrics—GDP growth lags, HDI stagnates (0.593), and governance indices remain dire. The regime manages crises, not progress.

Regional Comparisons

To compare Emmerson Mnangagwa’s leadership and policies with those of regional peers, I’ll focus on heads of state from Southern and Eastern Africa who have been in power during a similar timeframe (roughly post-2017) and whose countries offer a range of governance and economic outcomes.

The comparison will centre on management ability and civic administration, evaluated through key metrics like economic growth (GDP), human development (HDI), governance (World Bank Governance Indicators), and corruption (Transparency International’s CPI), alongside policy effectiveness. Selected leaders are Paul Kagame (Rwanda), Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa), and Mokgweetsi Masisi (Botswana)—each representing distinct approaches within the region.

Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe, since November 2017)

• Economic Management: GDP growth averaged 3-4% annually (e.g., 8.5% in 2021, 3% in 2023, per World Bank), but hyperinflation (over 500% in 2020) and currency instability plague progress. GDP per capita is $1,774 (2023, PPP), among the region’s lowest. Policies like the TSP and ZiG currency aim for stability but lack traction due to poor execution and corruption.
• Governance: Scores low on World Bank metrics—government effectiveness at 8.2/100, rule of law at 13.5/100 (2022). Elections (2018, 2023) were marred by repression and irregularities. CPI score of 24/100 (2023) reflects pervasive corruption.
• Civic Administration: Infrastructure (e.g., Harare-Beitbridge road) progresses slowly, while health and water services falter—cholera outbreaks killed 100 in 2023. HDI is 0.593 (2021), stagnant.
• Strengths: Maintains political control, leverages Chinese investment ($3 billion since 2018).
• Weaknesses: Economic mismanagement, authoritarianism, and elite capture undermine civic gains.

Paul Kagame (Rwanda, since 2000)

• Economic Management: GDP growth averaged 7-8% annually pre-COVID (6.2% in 2023, World Bank), driven by diversification into tech, tourism, and services. GDP per capita reached $2,405 (2023, PPP). Policies like Vision 2020 (now Vision 2050) emphasize state-led investment and private-sector growth, with Kigali as a regional hub.
• Governance: High government effectiveness (66.8/100) and control of corruption (62.5/100, 2022), but rule of law (47.6/100) and voice/accountability (15.6/100) lag due to authoritarian control. Elections are tightly managed, with Kagame winning 98.8% in 2017.
• Civic Administration: HDI rose to 0.548 (2021) from 0.333 in 2000, reflecting gains in health (life expectancy up to 69) and education. Infrastructure—clean cities, universal healthcare access—sets a regional standard.
• Strengths: Disciplined policy execution, low corruption (CPI 51/100, 2023), and investor appeal ($1.6 billion FDI in 2022).
• Weaknesses: Democratic suppression and reliance on Kagame’s centralized control raise sustainability questions.

Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa, since February 2018)

• Economic Management: GDP growth has been sluggish (0.8% in 2023, World Bank), hampered by energy crises (Eskom blackouts) and unemployment (33% in 2023). GDP per capita is $13,479 (2023, PPP), but inequality (Gini coefficient 63) is the world’s highest. Policies like the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (2020) target infrastructure and jobs but face slow rollout.
• Governance: Government effectiveness (54.8/100) and rule of law (50.5/100, 2022) are moderate, bolstered by democratic institutions, but corruption (CPI 41/100, 2023) persists—e.g., state capture scandals. Elections remain free and fair.
• Civic Administration: HDI is 0.717 (2021), but service delivery (water, housing) falters in townships, and crime rates are high. Infrastructure investment ($26 billion pledged in 2021) is underway but delayed.
• Strengths: Democratic legitimacy, regional economic heft, and policy ambition.
• Weaknesses: Bureaucratic inertia, ANC infighting, and failure to resolve energy and corruption crises.

Mokgweetsi Masisi (Botswana, since April 2018)

• Economic Management: GDP growth averaged 4-5% (4.1% in 2023, World Bank), driven by diamonds and tourism. GDP per capita is $16,199 (2023, PPP), the region’s highest. Policies diversify from mining (e.g., beef exports, renewable energy), though growth slowed post-COVID.
• Governance: Top regional performer—government effectiveness (68.3/100), rule of law (64.9/100), and control of corruption (64.4/100, 2022). CPI score of 60/100 (2023) reflects low corruption. Free elections (e.g., 2019) uphold democratic stability.
• Civic Administration: HDI is 0.708 (2021), with strong education and healthcare access. Infrastructure (roads, rural electrification) is reliable, though water scarcity persists.
• Strengths: Stable governance, prudent economic management, and investor trust ($500 million FDI in 2022).
• Weaknesses: Over-reliance on diamonds and limited economic scale.

Comparative Analysis

• Economic Performance: Kagame and Masisi outperform Mnangagwa significantly, with Rwanda’s rapid growth and Botswana’s steady prosperity contrasting Zimbabwe’s stagnation. Ramaphosa’s South Africa, despite its size, struggles with growth but still dwarfs Zimbabwe’s per capita output. Mnangagwa’s policies lack the coherence and follow-through seen in Rwanda’s state-driven model or Botswana’s fiscal discipline.
• Governance: Botswana and Rwanda score highest on effectiveness and corruption control, though Rwanda sacrifices democratic freedoms. South Africa’s democratic framework outshines Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism, but its governance is less efficient. Mnangagwa’s regime excels at political survival, not civic trust or rule of law.
• Civic Outcomes: Rwanda’s HDI gains and Botswana’s service delivery highlight administrative talent absent in Zimbabwe, where basic services collapse. South Africa’s higher HDI is offset by inequality and delivery gaps, yet it still surpasses Zimbabwe.
• Policy Execution: Kagame’s top-down discipline and Masisi’s pragmatic continuity contrast with Mnangagwa’s ad-hoc, patronage-driven approach. Ramaphosa’s ambitious plans are bogged down by coalition politics, but his context allows more accountability than Mnangagwa’s.

Conclusion

Mnangagwa lags behind Kagame, Masisi, and even Ramaphosa in management ability and civic administration. Kagame’s transformative vision and Masisi’s steady competence deliver measurable success—Rwanda’s growth and Botswana’s stability stand out on global metrics. Ramaphosa, despite challenges, operates within a stronger institutional base.

Mnangagwa’s policies, while showing intent (e.g., infrastructure, currency reform), fail to translate into economic or civic progress, reflecting a regime more skilled at retaining power than governing effectively.

Regional peers demonstrate that talent and context can yield results; Zimbabwe’s leadership, by contrast, appears constrained by systemic flaws and a lack of administrative depth.