IN May 2018, when the Zimbabwe Independent interviewed British peer Lord Peter Hain — a prominent critic of former president Robert Mugabe’s regime — he was optimistic about the birth of a new era in Zimbabwe and was hopeful the country could rise from the ashes.
BY BRIDGET MANANAVIRE
One year after the interview, Hain is now singing from a different hymn book: he is publicly saying President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government is a disaster and a mirror reflection of the old Mugabe era.
His dramatic volte-face is an indication of how Mnangagwa’s re-engagement drive, which initially had global goodwill, is stalling within just 12 months.
This Article is a continuation of a Question of Talent within Zanu PF and their 'Administration (see previous Article CLICK HERE)
Analysing Emmerson Mnangagwa’s policies as president of Zimbabwe since November 2017 involves examining their intent, implementation, and outcomes across key areas: economic management, governance, infrastructure, agriculture, and foreign relations. The focus here is on their practical impact, drawing from observable results rather than stated goals alone, and situating them within Zimbabwe’s challenging context—marked by decades of decline under Robert Mugabe, international sanctions, and domestic political tensions.
Economic Management
Mnangagwa’s flagship economic policy, encapsulated in the “Zimbabwe is Open for Business” mantra, aimed to attract foreign investment and stabilize the economy post-Mugabe. Key initiatives include:
Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP, 2018-2020): Led by Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube, this austerity-driven plan sought to cut public spending, remove subsidies, and introduce a new currency (the RTGS dollar, later replaced). It included a controversial 2% tax on electronic transactions to boost revenue. Implementation faltered due to public backlash—fuel price hikes in January 2019 sparked deadly protests—and persistent currency instability. Inflation soared to over 500% by 2020, eroding purchasing power.
Currency Reforms: The reintroduction of the Zimbabwean dollar in 2019 (abandoning the multi-currency system) and the launch of the gold-backed Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) in April 2024 aimed to curb hyperinflation and black-market trading. While the ZiG has shown early signs of stabilizing exchange rates, public trust remains low due to past currency collapses, and parallel markets persist. Real GDP growth was 8.5% in 2021 (a post-COVID rebound), but it slowed to 3% by 2023, per World Bank estimates, far below the 10% annual target of Mnangagwa’s “Vision 2030” for upper-middle-income status.
Outcome: Economic policies have failed to deliver sustainable growth or investor confidence. FDI inflows remain negligible (e.g., $340 million in 2022, per UNCTAD), dwarfed by regional peers like Zambia ($1.1 billion). Unemployment exceeds 80% informally, and poverty affects over 70% of the population, per ZimStat 2023 data. Talent in design exists—Ncube’s academic credentials suggest capability—but execution is undermined by corruption and lack of structural reform.
Governance and Political Administration
Mnangagwa promised a break from Mugabe’s authoritarianism, pledging democratic reforms and reconciliation:
We implore the British Government as represented by the Office of the Prime Minister, the Minister for Africa, the FCDO’s Southern Africa Desk and the FCDO’s Zimbabwe desk, as subject to the Election on the 4th July 2024 to action this PETITION; {CLICK HERE TO Read and/or Download}
Through the representations within the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, {New} Government Ministers, UK Embassy in Zimbabwe, the SADC liaison Group and the relations with the US Embassy in Zimbabwe;
We submit the following evidence as to the crimes of the ruling Zanu PF regime of which this PVO Bill is just a recent example.
We beseech the Government of the United Kingdom to entertain a more balanced representation of the interests of Zimbabwe, including opposition spokespeople both here in the UK diaspora, International diaspora and those faithful to the democratic process yet to be fully established by the Zanu PF regime – after 44 years in power.
The Zimbabwean President must not sign the new law proposed; which is the PVO Private Voluntary Organisation Amendment Bill. #STOPPVOBILL
Responding to the ‘PVO hearings’ which took place last week in Zimbabwe, Basil Kamombe a UK based Activist has condemned the violence which likely shows that a number of people present were bussed-in by Zanu-PF ‘elites’ and politicians. Cases of violence were recorded during the hearings.
“This bill is disastrous and especially a time where the Zimbabwean government is just passing laws that are shrinking the democratic space in Zimbabwe.”
How would something that likely benefit the country, but have a group of people singing
“Asingade ngaabude muZimbabwe” meaning if you don’t, want leave Zimbabwe or slogans like “tengesa uone mashura” (sellout and see what happens) it is the language of Zanu-PF and the language of violence to instil fear to those against the Bill,”
While Zimbabwe’s ruling party continues its campaign to quash opposition forces post-election, the Southern African Development Community takes a “business as usual” approach. November 13, 2023 9:20 am (EST)
Following Zimbabwe’s shambolic August elections, even the normally accommodating Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) observation mission acknowledged that the process “fell short of the requirements of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Electoral Act, and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.” So, what did Southern African leaders do at the most recent SADC Summit in Luanda? They “noted” the observation mission’s report, and nothing more. At a time when African citizens are clearly signaling [PDF] their frustration with manipulated elections and democratic window-dressing serving as cover for corrupt and authoritarian leadership, SADC leaders bury their heads in the sand.
It’s certainly not because the post-election trend line in Zimbabwe is positive, or because “quiet diplomacy” is bearing any fruit. Political violence persists in the wake of the elections. In early November, opposition member of parliament Takudzwa Ngadziore reported being abducted and violently assaulted, becoming at least the third opposition figure to report such treatment since the August elections. Still more have been arrested on spurious charges.
The state also has sustained its campaign of aiding and abetting political identity theft. First, a group with little real political base was assisted by Zimbabwe’s pliant judiciary in co-opting the name and resources of the Movement for Democratic Change, the country’s main opposition party for years, and forcing the real opposition to rebrand as the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) in 2022. Most recently, after a person claiming to be the “interim Secretary-General” of the CCC wrote to the speaker of the National Assembly claiming that fifteen newly elected opposition parliamentarians were no longer members of the party, riot police were dispatched to expel them from the chamber. The letter’s author has no legitimate claim to any leadership position in the CCC; he simply gave himself a title and carried on to pursue the agenda of the ruling ZANU-PF, which aims to hold by-elections to fill those seats in their quest to build a majority large enough to change the constitution. The same imposter has asked the Minister of Local Government to remove elected mayors and city councilors who were elected under the CCC banner. The absurdity of the situation is in part intended to convey the notion that petty infighting pervades the political scene, and that Zimbabwean citizens should simply steer clear.
President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his inner circle believe they can act with near-total impunity. While Southern African leaders bemoan the way Zimbabwe’s protracted crisis leads to politically explosive migration and dampens investor enthusiasm, they are unable or unwilling to confront the problem. It’s the same failure of leadership that has plunged other African regions into dangerous instability.
Reina Patel contributed to the research for this article.
Zimbabwe’s problem is Zanu PF’s intimidation and kleptocracy, not the country’s youth: Tony Reeler
THERE is a certain blindness in understanding the nature of Zimbabwean politics and elections if the problem is mostly attributed to an apathetic youth. A more analytical view includes other consequences for young people of State capture, corruption and political economy.
The recent article in Daily Maverick by historian and political economist Anotida Chikumbu, Here’s why Emmerson Mnangagwa will win Zimbabwe 2023, cannot go unchallenged. Simplistically contrasting urban and rural youth, and the apparent addiction to anything other than public consciousness, is not analysis, but opinion only.
There is a tendency to use the example of Zambia and the involvement of the youth as a panacea for Zimbabwe and the elections in 2023. This is a mistake for several reasons.
First, Zambia, like every single other SADC country, has the military firmly under civilian control. Unlike Zimbabwe, which has been a closed securocrat State since 2008, and, following the coup in 2017, clearly a militarised State.
Second, Zimbabwe and all its institutions are captured under this arrangement. Any reliance on the separation of powers or the independence of State institutions is mistaken.
Third, the rampant comprador behaviour, the corruption on an industrial scale, the total absence of oversight by Parliament over government (so clearly shown in the reports of the Auditor-General), and collapse of public services have reduced virtually the entire population to penury.
In this chaotic situation, the youth, who are nearly 70% of the population, as Chikumbu points out, are dominant in the nearly 90% unemployed.
Youth unemployment in Zimbabwe
A comment on unemployment is necessary here. The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (Zimstat) claims, based on the Inter-Censal Demographic Survey (ICDS) in 2017, that unemployment is only 11%, a figure based on data that says anyone earning any money at all is considered to be employed.
The Afrobarometer, which asks people whether they consider themselves employed, comes up with a very different picture. Looking at the youth in employment, only 8% (aged 18 to 25) in 2017 said they were “full-time, not looking”, and only 18% (aged 26 to 35) said the same. In 2022, the figure for the 18-to-25 group had dropped to 4%, while that for 26-to-35-year-olds remained the same.
The point here, Chikumbu, is that no matter what Zimstat says, the youth in their vast majority see themselves as unemployed, as they would in this well-educated country. Very well-educated young people have expectations of full-time, formal jobs. Rather than this being the case, they are scrabbling around in the informal sector to earn a subsistence, and increasingly a subsistence to merely survive.
As the Famine Early Warning Systems Network points out for the period June 2022 to January 2023:
“For most households, typical livelihood strategies will likely remain constrained, and income will remain below average throughout the outlook period. Food crop sales will be non-existent in deficit-producing areas, while sales will be marginal in surplus-producing areas. Casual labour opportunities and livestock sales will be below normal due to limited demand. Cross-border trade is increasing with the recent opening of land borders, although it will likely remain below pre-pandemic levels.”
You cannot talk about the youth running around playing video games, doing social media or drugs when the youth en masse have more serious issues to face.
Politics matters too
You cannot merely talk about economics when discussing Zimbabwe and the apathy of the youth: politics matters too, especially when it comes to elections. A more analytical view would look at the other fundamentals of political economy.
The first of these must be the excessively polarised nature of Zimbabwean politics. According to Afrobarometer, Zimbabwe is the most polarised country out of 34 African countries. A key feature of this polarisation is the fact that the government does not trust the youth and has not since 1999, when there was the emergence of a serious contender to political power, drawing substantial support from young people. And when a government does not trust its citizens, it is axiomatic that the citizens will not trust the government or the governing party.
Research shows that political trust in the government has been absent since 1999, and young people are no exception. We must not underestimate the repression faced by the youth in creating this lack of political trust in addition to the economic hardships.
As research shows, young people, and especially those in rural areas, find it very hard to escape the violence that comes with both
elections and the pressures of partisan demands.
Young Zimbabweans find all manner of ways to avoid being dragged into violent politics. The reality for Zimbabwean youth is that patronage along party or ethnic lines is a major barrier to finding jobs, and generational differences deny young people a voice.
Tony Reeler is co-convener of the Platform for Concerned Citizens. He is also a long-standing human rights activist and researcher on rights and governance. He writes here in his personal capacity.